Uniformity of Taxation in Missouri by Garden, M. J.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 2 
January 1939 
Uniformity of Taxation in Missouri 
M. J. Garden 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
M. J. Garden, Uniformity of Taxation in Missouri, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 242 (1939). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
:242 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
There is no substantial reason why the requirements of the
Morgan Case should be applied strictly to the procedure of such
boards as minimum wage commissions. They are not required
,of boards performing analogous functions nor by considerations
of expediency. Courts are likely to forget that there are other
means of controlling the administrative rule-making necessary
to our complex civilization. These include legislative power to
appoint the boards and define their policies and standards; a
capable and expert personnel; and a well-informed and articulate
-public opinion. Intertwined in today's multifarious processes are
far-reaching social problems which can be solved only by trained
workers. And "'Courts,' as Mr. Justice Stone has reminded us,
'are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to
have capacity to govern'; nor are they the only agency moved
by the desire for justice."56  CHARLoTr ANscnurz.
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION IN MISSOURI
I
Tax legislation, because of its immediate and vital effect upon
such great numbers of persons and properties, has been the
source of endless controversy. A tax provision that is constantly
-being litigated and which has resulted in many far-reaching and
important decisions is Section 3, Article X, of the Missouri Con-
stitution, which provides that
They [taxes] shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and collected by
general laws.
The interpretation- of Section 3 has resulted in certain rules
-and restrictions which many believe to be socially and economi-
cally unsound and impractical as well as inconsistent with the
true intent of the drafters of its terms. In order clearly to under-
stand these rules and restrictions, as well as the conclusions that
have been urged upon but rejected by the courts, some reference
must be made to the law relating to this subject prior to enact-
ment of the section.'
Since 1820 the following important provision, now Section 4,
Article X, has been a part of the Constitution. 2
56. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 154.
1. In 1875. R. S. Mo. (1929) 134.
2. See Glasgow v. Rowse (1865) 43 Mo. 479; Hamilton v. St. Louis
,County Court (1851) 15 Mo. 3.
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All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in propor-
tion to its value.
The scope of Section 4 as judicially interpreted must be under-
stood because it is Section 4 that has been the important limiting
factor in the construction and application of Section 3.
Section 4 by its terms applies only to property taxes and has
no effect upon privilege, license, or excise taxes. In applying
Section 4, therefore, the courts first had to determine whether a
particular tax was a property tax. If it was so construed, Sec-
tion 4 was held to prohibit its classification by the legislature,
inasmuch as all property taxes had to bear the same ratio of
assessment to the true value of the property. A property tax
on homes, on farms, on office buildings, on jewelry, on automo-
biles, and all other objects had to be levied at the same rate.3
Obviously this condition was undesirable, and Section 4 was,
in this respect, entirely too restrictive in its operation. The
framers of the Constitution of 1875 knew well that certain
,classes of property were by their very nature distinguishable
from other classes of property in respect to salability, usefulness,
income derivable therefrom, et cetera. That certain classes of
property were commonly owned by wealthy persons and used
principally for personal pleasure whereas other classes of prop-
erty were used as the means of earning a livelihood was com-
mon knowledge to the drafters. They also realized that other
classes of property had still other distinguishing features.' It
would seem, therefore, that any change in our Constitution which
by a liberal construction would have remedied this defect and
which would have permitted a reasonable classification of prop-
erty for the purpose of levying a property tax would have been
welcomed by our courts. The broad language of Section 3 af-
forded that opportunity, but such a construction has not re-
sulted.,
Another mischief existed prior to the adoption of Section 3
as a result of the restricted application of Section 4 solely to
3. State v. Wardell (1899) 153 Mo. 319, 54 S. W. 574; Copeland v. St.Joseph (1895) 126 Mo. 417, 29 S. W. 281; Brookfield v. Tooly (1897) 414
Mo. 619, 43 S. W. 387; St. Louis v. Spiegel (1881) 75 Mo. 145; State v.
State Tax Comm. (1920) 282 Mo. 213, 221 S. W. 721; State ex rel. Tomp-
kis v. Shipman (1920) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60.
4. See cases cited supra, note 3; see especially State ex rel. Tompkins v.
Shipman (1921) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60 for an excellent review of the
historical development of this problem.
5. The contention that the phrase, "Taxes** shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects," contemplated a classification of property taxes
as well as other taxes was rejected. See cases cited supra, notes 2 and 3.
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property taxes. License, privilege, or excise taxes could be levied
by the legislature without regard to any uniform ratio or to the
status of others similarly situated. This defect has been clearly
remedied by the adoption of Section 3.6 It has also been cured
by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, which provides that no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
II
Several important factors have influenced the courts in decid-
ing that Section 3 was not intended to apply to property taxes.
regardless of the fact that the classification proposed was proper
or reasonable. First, such a construction in effect would repeal
Section 4 by implication. If Section 3 is held to permit the proper
classification of-property taxes, it is also necessary that all with-
in the same class be taxed alike, because Section 3 provides that
"Taxes * * * shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects."'
But, the whole purpose of Section 4 is to create only one class in
levying property taxes, because the latter section provides that
all property, regardless of its character, shall be within one class.
Section 3, if applied to property taxes, would destroy the single
classification of property taxes as established by Section 4. It
seems, therefore, that the contention in State ex rel. Tompkins
v. Shipmn 8 that Section 3 could have been interpreted to permit
the legislature reasonably to classify property and to tax each
class at a different rate as long as the taxation in each class
conformed to the requirement of Section 48a was properly an-
swered by the court's statement that the equality provision of
Section 3 would require each class to be taxed alike without
the aid of Section 4 and, therefore, Section 3 would render Sec-
tion 4 a dead letter.- The doctrine of repeal by implication, al-
though applicable as well to constitutional as to statutory pro-
visions, is not favored by the courts. To justify the presumption
of an intention to repeal one provision by another, either the
two must be irreconcilable or the intent to effect a repeal must
be otherwise clearly disclosed. When this doctrine is urged to
sustain a repeal of a constitutional provision, the courts are
6. City v. Gates (1892) 110 Mo. 374, 19 S. W. 728; Kansas City v.
Whipple (1896) 136 Mo. 475, 38 S. W. 295.
7. Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 587-598.
8. (1921) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60. See also cases cited therein.
8a. L e., that the rate in each class must be proportionately the same.
9. St. Louis v. Spiegel (1881) 75 Mo. 145 clearly presents the operation
of this proposition.
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extremely reluctant. 0 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
courts have restricted the application of Section 3 to taxes other
than property taxes and have held that Section 4 still prevents
the classification of property for purposes of taxation.
Another reason influencing the courts in restricting the appli-
cation of Section 3 is that, although limited in operation, the sec-
tion does remedy one evil which existed prior to its adoption,
namely, the improper classification by the legislature of taxes
other than property taxes." In effect, therefore, a compromise
is reached, Section 3 not being given the broad interpretation
seemingly demanded by its language so as to permit the classi-
fication of property taxes in derogation of Section 4, yet being
given some effect. However, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution had already remedied this same defect prior
to the adoption of Section 3.12
A consideration upon which a broader interpretation of Sec-
tion 3 would have been justified and which would have permitted
a proper classification of property for the purpose of taxation is
the judicial desire to sustain the constitutionality of legislation
whenever there is any reasonable doubt as to invalidity, and a
construction can be found which will permit the act to be upheld. s
The legislature has passed numerous acts attempting to classify
property taxes, all of which have been declared invalid. 4 An-
other argument in favor of the broader construction is that
Section 3 is directed against "taxes," whereas under the present
limited construction Section 3 does not apply to property taxes,
which are undoubtedly "taxes." It would seem from its lan-
guage that Section 3 was intended to apply to all taxes rather
than to all taxes except property taxes, a contention supported
by the fact that the first sentence in Section 3 provides that
"taxes may be levied and collected for public purpose only," and
the word "taxes" here has uniformly been held to apply to prop-
erty as well as other taxes.25
10. Ibid.; see also Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Thornton (1899) 152 Mo. 570,
54 S. W. 445.
11. See eases cited supra, note 6.
12. See cases cited supra, note 7.
13. State v. Baskowitz (1913) 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945; Ex parte
Loving (1903) 178 Mo. 194, 77 S. W. 508.
14. See cases cited supra, note 3; St. Louis v. Green (1878) 7 Mo. App.
468; Aurora v. McGannon (1897) 138 Mo. 38, 39 S. W. 469; Kansas City v.
Richardson (1901) 90 Mo. App. 450; Ludlow-Saylor Co. v. Wollbrinck
(1918) 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196; Ex parte Asotsky (1928) 319 Mo. 810,
55 S. W. (2d) 22.
15. State ex rel. Tompkins v. Shipman (1921) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60;
State ex rel. v. St. Louis (1909) 216 Mo. 47, 115 S. W. 534.
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Another consideration, previously mentioned, is the inade-
quacy of the property tax system prior to 1875, under which,
while certain classes of property could not be assessed at a lower
rate than any other property, these classes of property presented
internal dissimilarities making them inappropriate in this con-
nection. An intent on the part of the framers of the Constitu-
tion of 1875 to permit a reasonable classification of property
taxes by the enactment of Section 3 is, therefore, not unlikely.10
In 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
had gone into effect, by which the states were prevented from
denying equal protection of the laws to all persons within their
jurisdiction. They could make reasonable and natural classifica-
tions of persons or property for purposes of taxation but un-
reasonable or arbitrary classifications for tax purposes were for-
bidden.17 Seven years before the adoption of Section 3, therefore,
the objective which our courts have construed the uniformity
provision of Section 3 as designed to accomplish had been reme-
died by the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, in adopting
this provision in Section 3, it might be said that the only purpose
was to accomplish a useless thing, a fact which one hesitates
strongly to find as having been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution of 1875.18
III
The most important practical problem is to determine whether
the particular litigated tax is a property tax or a license, privi-
lege, or excise tax. The rules and restrictions already discussed
will apply, once this determination is made. There is, however,
no absolute or definite test which will conveniently solve the
question of whether the tax in issue is a property tax.
A leading case on this problem is State ex rel. Tompkins v.
Shipman.9 In that case the act provided that certain kinds of
intangible property, including obligations not payable within one
year from the date of their issue, obligations of a state, county,
city, at cetera, and obligations secured by pledges or deeds of
trust were to be placed in a separate class for purposes of taxa-
tion. A recording tax, varying in amount in proportion to the
face value of the instruments evidencing these obligations and
the period of their maturity, was to be charged on them. They
were exempt from further taxation. The act was later amended
16. See cases cited supra, notes 3 and 4.
17. Willis, Cowstitutiona2 Law (1936) 587-598.
18. For cases in which this argument was advanced see notes 3 and 14,
supra.
19. (1921) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60.
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so as to include obligations secured by mortgages on real estate.
The court held that the act levied a property tax and not a privi-
lege tax, and that Section 4 rather than Section 3 was applicable.
Since, under Section 4, property taxes could not be classified,
this act was declared invalid.
Ex parte Asotsky, 2 0 sustaining a twenty per cent tax on ciga-
rettes, proposed the following test of whether a particular tax is
a property tax:
Even though a tobacco tax is, by the statute levying it,
sometimes referred therein as a tax on property, if, taking
the statute as a whole, it appears that the tax is collectable
only from those who are engaged in the business of selling
tobacco and tobacco products at retail and is measured in
proportion to the retail selling price, the tax is a license and
not a property tax. The incident or feature which makes
the tax a license tax, and not a property tax, is that it is
not levied on or collectable from the owner of the property
unless he is engaged in the business of selling it at retail,
and that it is levied and collected then only in proportion
approximately to the amount of the retail sales.21
The income tax has been held to be not a property but a privi-
lege tax,2 although, in some respects at least, regarded as a
property tax by the Supreme Court of the United States.3 A
franchise tax has uniformly been held to be a tax levied not upon
property, but upon the right to do business.2' An ordinance levy-
ing a license tax of one per cent per annum upon the cash value
of the stock of goods of merchants was held a property tax and
invalid as an attempt to classify property taxes.25 The court
pointed out that the name of the tax was not conclusive and that
its incidents determined its nature. A tax upon the registration
of automobiles was held not a property tax, the court stating
that since the owner of a motor vehicle may operate it on his
own premises without being subject to the payment of the auto-
mobile registration fee, the fee is not a tax on the vehicle but
on the privilege of operating it on the highways of the state.2 6
In State ex rel. Garth v. Switzler 2 an act to levy "a collateral
succession tax" provided that all property passing by will or by
20. (1928) 319 Mo. 810, 5 S. W. (2d) 22.
21. 5 S. W. (2d) at 27.
22. Ludlow-Saylor Co. v. Wollbrinck (1918) 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196;
Glasgow v. Rowse (1869) 48 Mo. 419.
23. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 601.
24. State v. State Tax Comm. (1920) 282 Mo. 213, 221 S. W. 721.
25. Brookfield v. Tooly (1897) 141 Mo. 619, 43 S. W. 387.
26. State v. Becker (1921) 288 Mo. 607, 233 S. W. 54.
27. (1898) 45 S. W. 245.
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death intestate to any person other than the father, mother, hus-
band, wife, or direct lineal descendants of the decedent, except
when conveyed for some educational, charitable, or religious pur-
pose exclusively, should pay a collateral inheritance tax of $5
for each $100 of the market value of such property up to $10,000,
and $7.50 in addition for every $100 of the excess above $10,000.
It was held that the act provided for a progressive property tax
rather than a progressive succession tax. The nature of this
levy was upon the property or the aggregate value of the whole
estate of the deceased rather than upon the right or privilege
of beneficiaries to receive the estate by inheritance or devise.
The enactment, therefore, violated the inhibition against any
classification of property taxes. The court conceded that the
legislature could validly levy a progressive tax upon the suc-
cession of estates which would not be a tax upon the property
in the ordinary sense but would be in the nature of an excise
imposed by the state upon the privilege or right to inherit or
succeed to an estate. In later cases, this dictum has been given
concrete effect, and succession taxes have been declared to be
beyond the purview of Section 4 and subject to reasonable pro-
gression or classification under Section 3.28
In declaring a gasoline tax upon dealers measured by the
volume of business not to be an ad valorem tax or a tax on
property, the court said:
There is no assessment of the property owned by the tax-
payer; it would not matter how much gasoline he owned at
any particular time, or whether he owned any gasoline at
all. It is measured by the volume of his business, without
any regard to the amount of gasoline on hand. Since he did
not store or transport gasoline, the tax was measured by the
amount of his sales.29
It is submitted that the courts have been liberal in holding
various types of taxes not to be property taxes, perhaps as a
result of an unconscious reaction against the limited interpreta-
tion placed upon Section 3; for if a tax is held not to be a prop-
erty tax, Section 3 permits reasonable classification. The press-
ing need of a graduated and classified property tax in many
situations is revealed by the tenor of the opinions and the argu-
ments of counsel accepted and rejected in the decisions.
28. State ex rel. Faith v. Henderson (1901) 160 Mo. 190, 60 S. W.
1093; State v. Guinotte (1918) 275 Mo. 298, 204 S. W. 806.
29. Viquesney v. Kansas City (1924) 305 Mo. 488, 266 S. W. 700, 702.
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IV
In applying Section 3 to those taxes which may be classified
(thus excluding property taxes), the determination of what
classifications by the legislature are reasonable depends primarily
upon the facts presented in each individual case.
In Glasgow v. Rowse0 the court, in sustaining a progressively
graduated income tax, said:
The Constitution enjoins a uniform rule as to the imposi-
tion of taxes on all property, but does not abridge the power
of the legislature to provide for revenue from other sources.
It was intended to make the burdens of government rest on
all property alike-to forbid favoritism and prevent in-
equality. Outside of the Constitutional restriction, the legis-
lature must be the sole judge of the propriety of taxation,
and define the sources of revenue as the exigency of the
occasion may require. The income tax was uniform and
equal as to the classes upon which it operated.3 '
Dealers in cigarettes have been placed in a class by them-
selves for purposes of taxation without violating the constitu-
tional requirements of uniformity of taxation, the court pointing
out that the tax was uniform upon all dealers in cigarettes and
that this particular legislative classification was reasonable, since
there are sufficient differences between cigarettes and tobacco to
put each in a separate tax class.32
An ordinance of Kansas City imposing a poll tax upon all male
citizens of a designated age and providing for exemptions from
such tax of all citizens who exercised the privilege of voting was
held invalid under Section 3. It was said that no legal classifica-
tion could be made between those exercising the franchise and
those who did not exercise it; hence the classification was un-
reasonable and void.3 3 It was further stated in this connection
that "the matter of classification for taxation purposes is one
for the legislature, with which the court will not interfere unless
the classification is clearly arbitrary.""
Thus, a law providing for the registration of automobiles and
for the payment of registration fees according to a schedule of
horse-power ratings, 5 a tax of $25 upon each car used to carry
passengers,36 an ordinance providing that each street railroad
30. (1869) 43 Mo. 479.
31. Id. at 491 (italics supplied).
32. Ex parte Asotsky (1928) 319 Mo. 810, 5 S. W. (2d) 22.
33. Kansas City v. Whipple (1896) 136 Mo. 475, 38 S. W. 295.
34. 88 S. W. at 296.
35. State v. Becker (1921) 288 Mo. 607, 233 S. W. 54.
36. St. Louis v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis (1915) 263 Mo. 387, 174
S. W. 78.
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shall pay a quarterly license fee for each car used in transport-
ing passengers to the amount of one mill for every pay passenger
carried on such car during the preceding quarter,, and a license
tax on persons engaged in the business of hauling garbage, as
well as a license tax on their vehicles for the use of the streets
have all been sustained.38
In St. Chwrles v. Schulte,9 a greater tax on the vendors of near
beers than on the vendors of other soft drinks was held proper.
The court pointed out that to collect a license tax on vendors of
soft drinks it is not necessary under Section 3 for the legislature
to levy the same amount on all vendors, but that it can, in its
discretion, divide them upon any reasonable basis into classes,
considering the amount of business, the specific character of the
drinks sold, et cetera, and levy a different tax for each class.
A city ordinance which required a license fee of $100 in one
part of thp city and $25 in the rest of the city upon owners of
meat-shops was held to be an arbitrary classification violating
Section 3.V0 A license tax upon all agents selling sewing machines
was held proper under Section 3, as well as under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 1
That other agents-agents engaged in other classes of
business-are not taxed by the city does not affect the con-
stitutional principle controlling this case. The only pro-
hibition of the section being discussed is that which forbids
inequality-favoritism-to be exercised in imposing taxes
upon the "same class of subjects." So long as this is not
done, the constitution is not infringed, nor the rules of uni-
formity and equality violated.
No one is denied the equal protection of the laws upon
whose occupation, or upon whose property, no greater bur-
den is imposed than is imposed upon the same occupation,
or the same kind of property, by the authority levying the
tax.42
An ordinance which imposed a license of $2 on merchants with
a stock of less than $1000, and $3 on those with a greater stock
did not violate Section 3.48 Although the complaining company
was the only one engaged in the gas business within the city, it
was held that a license tax upon all companies engaged in the gas
37. Ibid.
38. St. Louis v. Weitzel (1895) 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045.
39. (1924) 305 Mo. 124, 264 S. W. 654.
40. St. Louis v. Spiegel (1881) 75 Mo. 145.
41. St. Louis v. Bowler (1888) 94 Mo. 630, 7 S. W. 434.
42. 7 S. W. at 435.
43. Aurora v. McGannon (1897) 138 Mo. 38.
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business was proper, the court pointing out that the tax was
upon all those "similarly situated" and that the gas company
was merely in a class by itself." An ordinance of the city of
St. Louis imposing a tax of $25 a year on every lawyer in the
city without reference to the value of his practice is not obnoxious
to uniformity requirements.45
V
In the preceding section no attempt at systematic classification
was attempted, the purpose being rather to collate the decisions
dealing with various fact situations. Special phases of classifica-
tion for tax purposes will be considered in this section and in-
clude (1) exemptions, (2) gradations, and (3) deductions. These
problems will be treated as they relate to Section 4 and other
constitutional provisions, as well as in their application to Sec-
tion 3.
Prior to 1865 there was no restriction upon the legislative
power in the matter of granting exemptions from property
taxes." The Constitution of 1865, however, provides that the
property, real and personal, of the state, counties, and other
municipal corporations, and cemeteries, shall be exempt from
taxation.4 T In construing this provision, the Supreme Court held
that the prohibition of any exemptions from taxation required
that taxes be levied on all property. In other words, instead of
a system taxing enumerated articles, it was now necessary to
tax all property. This marked the introduction of the general
property tax in Missouri." The general property tax feature
was strengthened by the 1875 Constitution, which provided that
all laws exempting property from taxation, other than the prop-
erty above enumerated, should be void, and that property used
exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies and a
limited amount of real estate when used exclusively for religious,
charitable, and educational purposes should be included among
the above exemptions. 9 These enumerated exceptions have been
44. Ex parte Holman (1917) 172 Mo. 237, 72 S. W. 700.
45. St. Louis v. Sternberg (1879) 69 Mo. 289.
46. College v. Schaefer (1891) 104 Mo. 261, 16 S. W. 395. It should
be remembered, however, that see. 4 required such property taxes as were
levied by the legislature to be proportionate.
47. Mo. Const., art. X, see. 6; State ex rel. Morris v. Board of Trustees
of Westminster College (1903) 175 Mo. 52, 74 S. W. 990.
48. State v. Wardell (1899) 153 Mo. 319, 54 S. W. 574; State ex rel.
Tompkins v. Shipman (1921) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60.
49. Mo. Const., art. X, sees. 6 and 7; Kansas City v. Kansas City Medical
College (1892) 111 Mo. 141, 20 S. W. 35.
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held to be the only ones permissible in levying a property tax. 0
This interpretation is in accord with the tax maxim that taxa-
tion is the rule and exemption from taxation the exception."t
A more difficult problem arises when the legislature creates
various classes for the purpose of levying a license, excise, or
privilege tax, and some classes or persons are not made to bear
this tax. The commonest illustration of this is the income tax.
Different rates are created for different incomes, and incomes
below a certain amount are tax free.5 2 In the inheritance tax
is found another illustration of this form of exemption in that
certain types and amounts of bequests to very close relatives are
often not taxed.5 3 The validity of these exemptions turns upon
whether the tax is a property tax or an excise, license, or privi-
lege tax. If it is a property tax, any exemptions not within those
specifically and clearly enumerated in the Constitution are void.
If, however, the tax is upon some privilege or incidental use of
the property, the validity of the exemption depends upon its
reasonableness. In creating these exemptions, the legislature has
created a class. If all who are similarly situated are exempt, and
if there exists some reasonable and proper justification for ex-
empting this class from the tax, the exemption does not violate
Section 3. This reasoning explains why greater exemptions are
given to married than to single men in prescribing income taxes,"
and why a bequest to a mother or child may not be taxed whereas
one to a stranger may be taxed at a high rate.5
The validity of gradations in taxation stands upon the same
basis as exemptions except that there are no constitutional ex-
ceptions permitting gradations in levying any type of property
tax. All gradations in property taxes are invalid, since a grad-
uated progressive tax at a rate increasing with the amount of
property held would not constitute a proportionate ad valorem
tax. As regards taxes other than of property, the validity of
50. Copeland v. St. Joseph (1895) 126 Mo. 417, 29 S. W. 281; State v.
Wardell (1899) 153 Mo. 319, 54 S. W. 574.
51. State ex rel. Spillers v. Johnston (1909) 214 Mo. 656, 113 S. W.
1083; Pacific R R. v. Cass County (1873) 53 Mo. 17.
52. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 10115-10116.
53. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 575.
54. Glasgow v. Rowse (1869) 43 Mo. 479; Ludlow-Saylor Co. v. Woll-
brinck (1918) 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196.
55. State ex rel. Faith v. Henderson (1901) 160 Mo. 190, 60 S. W.
1093; State v. Guinotte (1918) 275 Mo. 298, 204 S. W. 806; cf. State ex rel.
Garth v. Switzler (1895) 143 Mo. 287, 45 S. W. 245, where the particular
type of succession tax levied was declared to be a property tax. For other
types of such exemptions which have been sustained as reasonable, see
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Chorn (1918) 274 Mo. 15, 201 S. W. 1122, 1125.
56. Such a tax would violate sec. 4. See cases cited supra, note 3.
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the gradations depends upon whether such gradations are reason-
able and whether all those within the same class have been taxed
alike. Here again the income tax57 and the inheritance tax58 fur-
nish examples of gradations which have been considered to be
reasonable and proper.
The problem of deducting debts for purposes of taxation has
caused some difficulty. It has been held that debts are not de-
ductible as a matter of right in levying either a property tax
as governed by Section 4, or a license, excise, or privilege tax
which falls under the protection of Section 3. As to the property
tax, deduction as of right has been denied on the ground that
the tax is on the value of the property itself rather than on the
owner's interest therein.5 9 Deduction of debts as of right in
assessing a license, excise, or privilege tax is denied, because
the tax is upon "the extent to which the company is using its
franchise," and not upon its assets.60 As to the power of the
legislature to permit deduction of debts as a matter of grace in
levying license, excise, or privilege taxes, the validity of the
deduction will depend upon whether or not the class as to which
the debts were deducted is a reasonable one after such deduc-
tion, and further upon whether or not all subjects similarly situ-
ated have been accorded the benefit of similar deduction. The
validity of reasonable deductions of debts under Section 3 has
been definitely sustained. 61 A deduction of debts in levying a
property tax, however, violates Section 4 unless the same per-
centage of deduction is allowed upon all property.62
VI
Another question under Sections 3 and 4 is that of "double
taxation." When all the property in the state has been taxed
upon its true value, or upon some uniform percentage thereof,
and then an additional property tax is levied upon A's property,
it is clear that A has been subjected to "double taxation." Such
legislative action would violate Section 4 in that all the property
of the State would not have been taxed upon the same propor-
57. See cases cited supra, note 54; R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 10115-10116.
58. See cases cited supra, note 55; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 575.
59. State v. State Tax Comm. (1920) 282 Mo. 213, 221 S. W. 721; State
v. Karr (1902) 64 Neb. 514, 90 N. W. 298 (similar constitutional restric-
tions) ; St. Louis v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis (1915) 263 Mo. 387, 174
S. W. 78.
60. St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co. (1892) 113 Mo. 83, 20 S. W. 699;
State ex rel. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1928) 320 Mo. 691,
8 S. W. (2d) 1068; and see cases cited supra, note 59.
61. See cases cited supra, notes 59 and 60.
62. Ibid.
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tion of its value.63 "Double taxation" also violates Section 3 in
that property which has been taxed once is taxed again, whereas
similarly situated property is not asked to bear a similar addi-
tional burden.6' The Missouri Supreme Court has announced
this rule concerning "double taxation":
The general policy of the law is to avoid duplicate tax-
ation. No one subject of taxation ought to be required to
contribute more than once to the same public burden, while
other subjects of taxation, belonging to the same class, are
required to contribute but once.
It is a fundamental maxim in taxation, therefore, that the
same property shall not be subject to a double tax by the
same party either directly or indirectly; and, when it is
once decided that any kind or class of property is liable to
-be taxed under one provision of the statutes, it has been
held to follow, as a legal conclusion, that the legislature
could not have intended that the same property should be
subject to another tax, though there may be general words
in the law which would seem to imply that it may be taxed
a second time. 5
Accordingly, a landowner, in paying the regular tax assessed
and charged on his lot, also pays the tax chargeable on his ease-
ment in the street on which it abuts, created by the plat and
deeds of his predecessor in title, and any attempt to charge a
further tax on such easement is an attempt to subject it to
"double taxation" and unenforceable. 6
Another phase of this problem is involved when several privi-
lege or license taxes are imposed upon property which has al-
ready paid a property tax. In St. Louis v. Weitzel" where the
city levied a property tax on a vehicle, a vehicle tax for the use
of the streets, and a tax on the business or occupation of carry-
ing passengers, the contention that this involved "triple taxa-
tion" was overruled. Use of the streets was held to be a privi-
lege upon which a tax might be levied, if it was levied upon all
those similarly situated and exercising the privilege and if the
class was a reasonable one; and like reasoning sustained the
franchise tax based upon the privilege of carrying on the trans-
63. Bank v. Schlotzhauer (1927) 317 Mo. 1298, 298 S. W. 732; see cases
cited infra, notes 65 and 66.
64. Ibid.
65. State ex rel. Pearson v. La. Ry. Co. (1906) 196 Mo. 523, 94 S. W.
279, 281 (italics supplied); see also State v. Ry. (1883) 77 Mo. 202.
66. State ex rel. Koeln v. West Cabanne Imp. Co. (1919) 278 Mo. 310,
213 S. W. 25.
67. (1895) 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045.
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portation business. The taxing authority may, therefore, levy
a tax upon as many different and distinct privileges and licenses.
as surround the use of the particular property if each classifica--
tion is reasonable and all similarly situated are made to bear-
the same tax.68
Vii
Where the property of a taxpayer is assessed at a dispropor-
tionate valuation, all property has not been equally assessed in.
proportion to its value as required by Section 4. Further the
tax is not uniform upon the same class of subjects as required
by Section 3. In accord with the majority of other jurisdictions,
Missouri courts have held that equity will not relieve against an
assessment merely because it happens to be at a higher rate than
that of other property. Inequalities due to mistake, to the falli-.
bility of human judgment, or to other accidental causes must.
be borne for the reason that absolute uniformity can not be ob-
tained. Equitable interference in such cases on the ground that
Sections 3 and 4 have been violated would constitute a serious:
and detrimental obstruction to the collection of taxes. The only
remedy is an appeal to the board of equalization to have the,
assessment changed to its proper value.69
Where there is a deliberate, wilful, or systematic overassess-
ment at a greater percentage of full value than is assessed upon
other property, the enforcement of the tax will be enjoined on
the ground that it violates Sections 3 and 4. There is no eco-
nomic or public policy to support a conscious overvaluation by
administrative officers; hence the courts refuse to extend judicial'
abdication to cases of this type and permit the taxpayer to inter-
fere with the collection of the tax.70 The terms of Sections 3 and
4, however, make no distinction between conscious and uninten-
tional acts of discrimination.
VIII
In analyzing the requirement that "Taxes *** shall be uni-
form upon the same class of subjects" imposed by Section 3,
68. Leading cases on this subject are St. Louis v. United Rys. Co. of'
St. Louis (1915) 263 Mo. 387, 174 S. W. 78; Aurora v. MeGannon (1897)
138 Mo. 45, 39 S. W. 469; Kansas City v. Richardson (1901) 90 Mo. App.
450; Kansas City v. Grush (1899) 151 Mo. 128, 52 S. W. 286; St. Louis v.
Bowler (1888) 94 Mo. 630, 7 S. W. 434; Ex parte Holman (1917) 172 Mo.
237, 72 S. W. 700.
69. Columbia Terminal Co. v. Koeln (1928) 319 Mo. 445, 3 S. W. (2d)
1021; State v. Severance (1874) 55 Mo. 378; St. Louis Electric Bridge Co.-
v. Koeln (1926) 315 Mo. 424, 287 S. W. 427.
70. Boonville Nat. Bank v. Schlotzhauer (1927) 317 Mo. 1298, 298 S. W-
732.
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Article X of the Constitution, constitutional provisions, statutes,
and legal maxims are seen to have influenced the courts' final
,determinations. Among these competing rules, some must give
way since, by their very nature, not all can be applied. Defects
and gaps have resulted. The most serious one perhaps is the
inability of the legislature to levy a graduated or classified prop-
erty tax based upon reasonable and justifiable considerations.
The only remedy would appear to lie in a constitutional amend-
ment since there is little room to doubt that Section 3 has failed
to and can no longer accomplish this end and that Section 4 pre-
-vents such legislative action.
M. J. GARDE.t
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF INTERCEPTED
COMMUNICATIONS
At common law the admissibility of evidence is not affected by
the illegality of the means by which it is obtained.1 The illegality
is not condoned but ignored, because such a collateral issue can
mot be raised at the trial and because it in no way affects the
probative value of the evidence. 2 The remedy for invasion of the
immunity against illegal seizure of evidence is a suit for dam-
ages against the searching officer 3 or a prosecution for criminal
contempt.4
The right to personal security and privacy of the home as
t Member of the St. Louis Bar.
1. Jordan v. Lewis (K. B. 1740) 2 Stra. 1122, 93 Eng. Rep. 1072, 104
Eng. Rep. 618; Commonwealth v. Dana (Mass. 1841) 2 Mete. 329, 337;
Adams v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585; 5 Jones, Evidence (2d ed.
1926) 3865-83, sees. 2075-6, 2080. It appears that at least twenty-six states
:till follow the original common-law rule in its original vigor. Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed. Supp. 1934) 920-950, secs. 2183-4 and notes. Arkansas
and Kansas are among these states. Knight v. State (1926) 171 Ark. 882,
286 S. W. 1013; State v. Johnson (1924) 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245.
2. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure
(1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1. Fraenkel asserts that the theory of the first
ground is untenable. He points out that collateral inquiry has always been
allowed where a confession has been attacked as improperly obtained. The
,competency of witnesses is often the subject of collateral inquiry. The
objection may also be obviated by motion before trial for return or sup-
-pression of the illegally procured evidence. Weeks v. United States (1914)
232 U. S. 383.
3. Wilkes v. Wood (K. B. 1763) 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep.
489; Entick v. Carrington (K. B. 1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng.
'Rep. 807; Commonwealth v. Dana (Mass. 1841) 2 Mete. 329; and see Rhodes
v. Graham (1931) 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46.
4. See People v. Defore (1926) 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585; 4 Wig-
more, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 639, sec. 2184.
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